Competitive conditions in the Central and Eastern European banking systems by Delis, Manthos D
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Competitive conditions in the Central
and Eastern European banking systems
Manthos D Delis
31. December 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13890/
MPRA Paper No. 13890, posted 10. March 2009 05:42 UTC
 
 
 
Competitive conditions in the Central and Eastern European banking 
systems 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of the competitive conditions 
in the banking systems of Central and Eastern European countries. The well-known model of 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) is implemented on bank-level data over the period 1999-2006. The 
estimates based on the separate country panels suggest a wide variation in the competitive 
conditions of the banking systems examined, with some being characterized as 
(monopolistically) competitive and other as non-competitive. Finally, the results from the full 
sample indicate that bank revenue is substantially influenced by structural and macroeconomic 
conditions. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to provide a large scale analysis of the competitive 
conditions in the banking sectors of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, in light of 
the reforms implemented in these countries and the immense changes in their banking systems. 
Besides the decisive shifts in the political regime, the transition in these countries occurred as a 
consequence of the increasing monetary and financial integration, as well as deregulation of the 
domestic financial system and liberalization of capital flows. The vital role of banks in these 
economies encompasses their participation in the payment system, the transmission of monetary 
policy, and the provision of credit. Thus, any market failure, inefficiency, or anticompetitive 
conduct among banks, is likely to impose more severe costs throughout the economy – in terms 
of both allocative efficiency and distributional fairness – than would similar defects in many 
other industries. 
In the academic literature of the banking industry, several authors have assessed the level 
of competition in banking markets, at different levels of aggregation. Some consider the whole of 
submarkets in which banks operate, while others concentrate on one (or more) specific 
submarket(s) (for a recent review of the literature, see Delis et al., 2008). This literature can be 
divided into two major streams that employ either structural or non-structural models. The 
structural approach embraces the structure-conduct-performance and the efficiency hypotheses, 
as well as a number of formal approaches with roots in industrial organization theory. The two 
hypotheses examine, respectively, whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive 
behavior among the larger banks (thus resulting in superior market performance), or whether it is 
the efficiency of larger banks that enhances their performance. Although lacking formal back-up 
in microeconomic theory, these hypotheses have frequently been tested in the banking industry 
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and provide policy makers with measures of market structure and performance as well as their 
interrelationship. 
However, due to several deficiencies arising from the application of the structural 
approach, the ongoing developments in the industrial organization literature, and the recognition 
of the need to endogenize the market structure, many empirical studies followed a new course.1 
The non-structural approach to the evaluation of competitive conditions has emerged under the 
impulse of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. This approach, 
pioneered by Iwata (1974) and strongly enhanced by Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982, 
1989), Lau (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987), tests for the presence of market power by 
stressing the analysis of banks’ competitive conduct. Specifically, the NEIO literature attempts to 
measure the competitive conduct of firms at the industry level by estimating deviations from 
competitive pricing (without explicitly using information on the structure of the market). A 
major advantage of this approach is its formal grounding in explicit optimization models and 
equilibrium conditions.2
The Panzar and Rosse (1987) approach (PR hereafter) offers an appropriate framework 
for testing for market power by relying on the premise that banks will employ different pricing 
strategies in response to a change in input costs, depending on the market structure in which they 
operate. In other words, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor 
prices are reflected in revenue. PR define a measure of competition, the ‘H-statistic’, which 
represents the percentage variation from the equilibrium revenue derived from an infinitesimal 
                                                 
1 For a thorough critique of the structural approach, see Bresnahan (1989). 
2 There has also been some critique of the NEIO literature, especially as regards the models of Appelbaum (1982) 
and Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). The main elements of critique are the use of a single functional form to 
describe all firms and the failure of these models to incorporate dynamics (see e.g. Genesove and Mullin, 1998; 
Corts, 1999; Delis et al., 2008). The fact that the Panzar and Rosse (1987) approach offers a long-run equilibrium 
test, probably makes it more suitable in the context of the present study. 
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percent increase in the price of all factors used by the firm. In this vein, the H-statistic may 
indicate the existence of monopolistic, monopolistically competitive or perfectly competitive 
structures. 
The PR methodology has been extensively applied to the European banking sector, both 
on regional and single-country studies (see e.g. Molyneux et al., 1994; De Bandt and Davis, 
2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Coccorese, 2004). In addition, a growing body of recent literature 
has focused on emerging economies. Among these studies, Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 
analyzed the competitive conditions in the banking industries of fourteen CEE countries for the 
period 1993-2000. Their results suggest that most of the banking sectors examined are 
characterized by monopolistic competition (notable exceptions are FYROM and Slovenia). 
Similar findings are reported by Gelos and Roldos (2004). Finally, Mamatzakis et al. (2005) 
measure the degree of competition in the banking sector of the South Eastern European region 
over the period 1998-2002, and reach the conclusion that banks also earn their interest and total 
revenue under conditions of monopolistic competition.  
In this paper, I extend the scale of the analysis to 22 CEE countries for the last eight years 
of available data (1999-2006). Therefore, this paper augments previous studies by using (i) the 
entire set of CEE countries covered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and (ii) very recent data. This may be quite important if one considers the fact that in 
many CEE countries the deregulation and liberalization process has been completed during the 
2000s, while in other this process is still underway. In a second step, the full sample is used to 
examine the impact of the significant structural and macroeconomic developments that took 
place during the sample period on bank revenue, which is an important element of the 
identification of market power in the PR framework.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some characteristics of 
the banking systems and macroeconomic environments of the CEE countries. Section 3 discusses 
the PR methodology and the estimation procedure. Section 4 presents and analyzes the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The CEE banking industry 
Since the mid-1990s, the CEE financial and banking landscape has changed rapidly. The 
environment that emerged gave impetus to the establishment and operation of new credit 
institutions, either domestic ones or branches of foreign banks. A specific structural feature of 
the status quo ante of the CEE financial system, characterizing in particular the old banking 
regime, was the significant level of state intervention, which for a long time hindered 
competition and created a distorted market environment (see EBRD, 2006). Indeed, in 1999 the 
state commercial banks controlled around 31 per cent of total commercial banking assets, which 
is a low portion compared to that of the early 1990s. During the early 2000s, privatization of 
several banks controlled by the state was further enhanced and, as a result, the percentage of 
directly or indirectly state-controlled banks was reduced significantly to only 12 per cent in 2006 
(see Table 1).  
In addition, a number of new, mainly foreign, commercial banks opened during the 1999-
2006 period and a series of mergers and acquisitions were undertaken, altering the level of bank 
concentration and substantially changing the structure of the CEE banking systems. These 
mergers and acquisitions have reversed the downward trend in bank concentration observed in 
many CEE banking systems during the 1990s. Note, however, that differences in concentration 
between countries are significant, with countries like Azerbaijan and Lithuania presenting the 
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most concentrated banking systems and Bulgaria and Ukraine being at the opposite end (see 
Table 1). 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
To compete in the new financial landscape and strengthen their position in the market, 
CEE commercial banks have been transforming themselves into financial groups mainly by 
adding subsidiaries – such as insurance companies, brokerages, credit card companies, mutual 
fund firms, factoring companies and finance houses – so as to offer additional services. These 
developments resulted in significant modifications in the balance sheet and profit and loss 
accounts of banks. Most notably, the ratio of equity to total assets (ea) fell significantly from an 
average of 19 per cent in 1999 to an average of 14 per cent in 2006 (see Table 2), being much 
closer to EMU standards. In addition, the proportion of loans to total assets (la) reached 59 per 
cent in 2006 (compared to 43 per cent in 1999), also catching up with the average European 
levels.3
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
Last but not least, the CEE credit institutions took important steps towards improving 
their efficiency by deploying modern information technology systems, cutting down on their 
operating costs and improving their organizational structure (see Brissimis et al., 2008), while 
extending their scope of business by offering new products and services. Taking into account 
these developments, the indications of an upward trend in profitability towards the last years of 
our sample (see Table 2) are not surprising, a fact that may have important implications for the 
market power of CEE commercial banks. 
                                                 
3 Several factors have been responsible for the high rates of growth of bank lending, including the relatively-high 
rate of growth of the CEE economies, the gradual convergence of CEE lending rates to those of the rest of the euro 
area and the release of commercial bank funds from the national central banks due to the harmonization of reserve 
requirements with the EMU. For detailed information on EU banking structures, see ECB (2007). 
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The progress of the CEE banking systems in areas such as i) the adoption of regulations 
according to international standards and practices, ii) the implementation of higher and more 
efficient supervision, iii) the privatization of state-owned banks and iv) the write-off of non-
performing loans and the closure of insolvent banks, is reflected in the EBRD index of banking 
sector reform (ebrd). This index provides a ranking of progress for liberalization and institutional 
reform of the banking sector, on a scale of 1 to 4+. A score of 1 represents little change from a 
socialist banking system apart from the separation of the central bank and commercial banks, 
while a score of 4+ represents a level of reform that approximates the institutional standards and 
norms of an industrialized market economy (EBRD, 2006). On the basis of this index, CEE 
countries get an average score around 3.3 in 2006, most of them coming up from much lower 
levels observed in 1999 (see Table 1). Overall, these scores imply that, despite the improvement 
that took place recently in the banking system of the CEE countries, still some countries have not 
reached the level of EU practice.  
Finally, macroeconomic factors, such as fiscal and monetary discipline, the gradual 
reduction of interest rates and risk premiums, the rise of expected lifetime income in the region 
and an increasing money demand have all positively contributed to the development of financial 
markets (EBRD, 2006). These developments enhanced the ongoing rise and broadening of 
intermediation in the CEE region. Yet, differences among the CEE countries in the average value 
of the macroeconomic variables remain quite significant (see Table 1). For example certain 
countries like Belarus and Romania were still facing hyperinflation, while Moldova, Georgia and 
Armenia are still considered among the poorest countries in the world.  Such characteristics of 
the CEE countries may have important implications for the estimation and the sources of market 
power.    
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 3. The Panzar-Rosse model 
The PR model for measuring market power relies on the premise that each bank will 
employ a different pricing strategy in response to a change in input costs, depending on the 
market structure in which this bank operates (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). Phrased differently, 
market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices are reflected in 
revenue. The authors define a measure of competition, the H-statistic, as the sum of the 
elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices. Thus, the H-
statistic represents the percentage variation from the equilibrium revenue derived from an 
infinitesimal percent increase in the price of all factors used by the firm.  
PR assert that the H-statistic is negative when the competitive structure is a monopoly, a 
perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a conjectural variations short-run oligopoly; an increase in input 
prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output, and subsequently reduce 
revenue.4 Under perfect competition, where banks’ products are regarded as perfect substitutes 
of one another, the Chamberlinian model, based on free entry of banks and determining not only 
the output level but also the equilibrium number of banks, produces the perfectly competitive 
solution (as demand elasticity approaches infinity). Thus, in this case, the H-statistic is equal to 
unity. Shaffer (1982) shows that the H-statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in 
a perfectly contestable market and also for a sales-maximizing firm that is subject to breakeven 
constraints. Consequently, an increase in input prices raises both marginal and average costs 
without altering the optimal output of a bank. Exit from the market will evenly increase the 
                                                 
4 In the case where the monopolist faces a demand curve with constant price elasticity (i.e. e > 1) and where a constant 
returns to scale Cobb–Douglas technology is employed, Panzar and Rosse proved that the H-statistic is equal to e-1. 
Hence, apart from the sign, the magnitude of the H-statistic may also be of importance, as the H-statistic yields an 
estimate of the Lerner index of monopoly power L = (e-1)/e = H/(H-1) (Shaffer, 1983). 
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demand faced by each of the remaining banks, thereby leading to an increase in prices and total 
revenue by the same amount as the rise in costs (i.e. demand is perfectly elastic). Finally, if the 
H-statistic is between zero (inclusive) and unity (exclusive), the market structure is characterized 
by monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition, potential entry leads to 
contestable market equilibrium, and income increases less than proportionally to the input prices, 
as the demand for banking products facing individual banks is inelastic.  
This method is a valuable tool for assessing market conditions, mainly owing to its 
simplicity and transparency, without lacking efficiency. Moreover, data availability becomes 
much less of a constraint, since bank revenue is more likely to be observable (as opposed to 
output prices). Also, by utilizing bank-level data, this approach allows for bank-specific 
differences in the production function. In addition, the non-necessity to define the location of the 
market a priori implies that the potential bias caused by the misspecification of market 
boundaries is avoided; hence for a bank that operates in more than one market, the H-statistic 
will reflect the average of the bank’s conduct in each market. 
The H-statistic is derived using the following specification of the reduced-form revenue 
equation for a panel dataset: 
0 1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4ln ln ln ln lnit it it it it itrtr w w w eaβ β β β β= + + + + + ε
                                                
      (1) 
where the subscript it indicates bank i at time t, rtr stands for a bank’s real total revenue, w1, w2 
and w3 are the three input prices and ea stands for the ratio of equity to assets.5 As discussed 
above, the H-statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities of total revenue with respect to the 
three input prices, i.e. H = β1 + β2 + β3. The log specification is used to improve the regression’s 
 
5 Some authors also add the logarithm of total assets to control for bank size. However, the addition of total assets in 
the revenue equation makes it de facto a price equation, which may lead to a systematic bias in the estimation of the 
price parameters, and therefore the H-statistic (see Vesala, 1995). The dependent and independent variables chosen 
for estimating this basic model are the ones most widely employed in the literature (see Delis et al., 2008). Several 
other variables will be used to examine the sensitivity of the results (see Section 4.2 below).     
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goodness of fit and to reduce possible simultaneity bias (see De Bandt and Davis, 2000). Also, 
Molyneux et al. (1996) found that a log-linear revenue equation gives results similar to those of a 
more flexible translog equation. The three input prices are generated by dividing (i) interest 
expenses by total deposits (w1), (ii) depreciation and other capital expenses by fixed assets (w2) 
and (iii) personnel expenses by total assets (w3). Table 2 provides country-specific average 
values for all the variables included in Eq. (1). Furthermore, the Baltagi-Wu test-statistic reveals 
that the error term should be treated as first order autoregressive. Therefore, to estimate Eq. (1) 
we use a panel-data, random-effects (RE) estimator with a first-order autoregressive disturbance 
term (see Baltagi, 2005).6
 Finally, a critical feature of the H-statistic is that the test must be undertaken on 
observations that are in long-run equilibrium (not subject to severe dynamics). The empirical test 
for equilibrium is justified on the grounds that competitive capital markets will equalize the risk-
adjusted rate of return across banks, so that (in equilibrium) the rate of return should not be 
statistically correlated with input prices. Therefore, to test for equilibrium, one can calculate the 
H-statistic (Hn) using the rate of return, instead of total revenue, as the dependent variable in the 
regression equation. The largest body of the existing literature uses a regression that relates the 
return on assets (roa) with input prices. In this framework, Hn=0 indicates that banking systems 
are in equilibrium. However, the argument also holds if the return on equity is used as the 
dependent variable instead (see Molyneux et al., 1996; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002 for a thorough discussion of these issues).  
 
 
                                                 
6 The suitability of a RE model was tested against a fixed effects (FE) model, using a Hausman test. The results 
showed that the difference in coefficients is not systematic, thus providing evidence against FE. 
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4. Estimation results 
4.1 Basic results 
 As discussed above, the dataset of the present study consists of bank- and country-level 
variables. All bank-level data are obtained from BankScope and include 3087 observations from 
529 commercial banks7 (therefore the panel is unbalanced). These banks operated during the 
period 1999-2006 in the 22 CEE countries reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Some banks have been 
excluded from the empirical analysis, given that their figures were unreasonable (very high input 
prices) or some of the required data were missing. Averages of the bank-level variables, along 
with the number of banks and observations by country are provided in Table 2. Moreover, the 
structural and macroeconomic variables included in the empirical analysis are the EBRD index 
of banking sector reform, ebrd; the 3-bank concentration ratio, conc3 (obtained form the World 
Bank); the share of majority state-owned banks’ assets in total banking sector assets, state 
(obtained from the EBRD); the share of total banking sector assets in banks with foreign 
ownership exceeding 50 per cent, foreign (obtained from the EBRD); the GDP per capita in US 
dollars, gdpcap (obtained from the EBRD); and the inflation rate, inf (obtained from the EBRD). 
  Table 3 reports the estimates obtained from applying the methodology described in 
Section 3 to the individual banking sectors. Most of the input prices and the capital ratios 
reported in Table 3 are statistically significant at conventional levels, which implies good fit of 
the revenue equations. However, contrary to the findings of previous studies (see e.g. Claessens 
and Laeven, 2004; Gelos and Roldos, 2004), the H-statistic varies widely between countries, 
with Kazakhstan presenting the lowest score (-0.6) and Poland the highest (0.85). Besides 
Kazakhstan, the banking systems of Bosnia, Estonia and FYROM are characterized by anti-
                                                 
7 I have decided to restrict the analysis to commercial banks only so as to avoid comparing banks with different 
products, clientele and objectives. 
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competitive (monopolistic) practices. For countries like Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and Ukraine the H=0 hypothesis is not rejected at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. The banking systems of these countries are characterized by monopolistic 
competition, but they are on the edge of presenting some anti-competitive conduct. Indeed, if one 
considers the extension of the PR model of Bikker and Haaf (2002), where the H-statistic is 
opted as a continuous measure of the level of competition, then it holds that countries with 
values close to zero are characterized by less competition, whereas countries with values closer 
to unity are characterized by relatively competitive practices.8 For the rest of the countries the 
dominant market structure is monopolistic competition, as their H-statistics differ significantly 
from both zero and unity.9 Finally, I test for long-run equilibrium using roa as the dependent 
variable as discussed above. The results (not reported but available upon request) suggest that the 
hypothesis of equilibrium (i.e. Hn=0) is confirmed for all the banking systems, but Bosnia (p-
value of t-test=0.001) and Estonia (p-value=0.000).10
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
 Apart from the aforementioned country-specific estimates, we use the full sample to re-
estimate the PR model, also including a number of structural and macroeconomic characteristics 
for the countries examined. These characteristics are reported in Table 4, along with their 
correlation statistics. Note that ebrd presents relatively high correlations with some of the rest of 
the variables and, therefore, we do not use this variable along with the other control variables to 
                                                 
8 However, this approach has been criticized by Shaffer (2004a,b), who suggests that the H-statistic does not map as 
robustly as the estimates obtained from the Bresnahan-Lau method into a range of conduct solutions. 
T9 Note that any grouping of countries based on the relationship of the H-statistic with structural or macroeconomic 
conditions is not possible. For example the Pearson correlation of H with ebrd and conc3 is as low as -0.02 and 0.02, 
respectively. 
10 Notably, these two countries faced a very unstable economic and political environment during the sample period, 
which may be an important reason for the observed disequilibrium. 
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avoid problems of multicollinearity. The estimation results are presented in Table 5. The H-
statistic ranges between 0.110 and 0.205 among the different specifications, reflecting 
monopolistically competitive conditions (as the hypotheses H=0 and H=1 are rejected at 
conventional levels of statistical significance). Given the country-specific estimates provided 
above, this result is certainly of not particular importance. The main element of interest here is 
the impact of the structural and macroeconomic variables on revenue, which is found to be quite 
significant in all specifications.11 The variable ebrd presents a positive and highly significant 
coefficient, which implies that as banking sectors are reformed, revenues substantially increase. 
Another quite appealing result is the negative impact of state ownership and the positive impact 
of foreign ownership on bank revenue. This certainly implies that penetration of foreign banks 
and the observed reduction of state ownership will eventually result in improved competition as 
foreign entry will continue. As regards the macroeconomic variables, the results meet our 
expectations, with both gdpcap and inf presenting a positive and significant effect on bank 
revenue. On the one hand, higher economic prosperity leads to enhanced investments and 
therefore lending and bank revenue rises. On the other hand, higher inflation usually implies 
higher interest margins, which are naturally associated with increased bank revenue. In addition, 
the positive nexus between inflation and bank revenue may suggest that banks are better able to 
form expectations for the future level of inflation than their customers, which in turn implies that 
interest rates have been appropriately adjusted to achieve higher revenues (see Athanasoglou et 
                                                 
11 Some of the previous literature suggested regressing the country-specific H-statistics on a similar set of structural 
and macroeconomic variables (see e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004). However, regressing estimates for the H-
statistic (obtained from OLS or similar estimation methods) against some control variables is almost certain to result 
in problems of statistical consistency. This is because the covariates in the second-stage regression are correlated 
with the error terms from the first stage regression; otherwise there would be no need for the second stage regression 
(this holds regardless of whether the H-statistic maps robustly into a range of solutions as discussed in footnote 8 
above). To overcome this problem, the second-stage regressors should be made functions of either the H-statistic 
(and hence of the input prices) or of the error term in a single stage approach. As this procedure is beyond the scope 
of the present paper, I will leave it to future research.  
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al., 2008). Note that the positive relationship between inflation and bank revenue holds 
regardless of the fact that inflation has been decreasing throughout the sample period (see Table 
1).12 Finally, concentration has a significant impact on bank revenue, only when the 
macroeconomic variables are not included in the estimated equations (specifications II and III).13 
This outcome is in accordance with Berger (1995) who claims that concentration is usually an 
insignificant determinants of bank revenues and profits once other effects, external to the bank 
management, are controlled for. 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 In this section I inquire into the robustness of the results in three ways. First, I use two 
alternative dependent variables, second I employ two more bank-specific control variables and 
third I re-estimate the model using a dynamic panel data method. The alternative dependent 
variables employed (in place of real total bank revenue) are real gross interest revenue (used to 
isolate competitive conditions in revenue generated by lending) and the ratio of total bank 
revenue over total assets.14 Use of both variables suggests very similar results with those 
reported in Table 3 (see columns H1 and H2 of Table 6). 
[Please insert Table 6 about here]     
Besides ea, other bank-specific factors were used as additional control variables to reflect 
differences in credit risk (the ratio of loan loss provisions to assets) and the asset mix (the ratio of 
                                                 
12 Alternatively to the inflation rate, the one-year interest rate has been employed as a proxy for the monetary 
conditions. The results were very similar to those of the inflation rate and hence they are not reported.  
13 Note that this holds despite the fact that the Pearson correlation of conc3 with the macroeconomic control 
variables is low.  
14 These variables are used by a number of papers that employ the PR methodology, including Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) and Bikker and Haaf (2002). 
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loans to assets). Once again, these variables even though they were found to be statistically 
significant determinants of bank revenue in almost all country panels, they possessed no impact 
on the H-statistic (see column H3 of Table 6). Therefore, I decided to limit the basic analysis to 
the use of capital adequacy, so as to simplify both the strategy and the main results of the paper. 
Finally, and probably more notably, I check for the existence of dynamics in the data by 
fitting a dynamic panel data model, which includes lags of both the dependent and the 
independent variables. Dynamics have been examined in this fashion by Delis et al. (2008), who 
report that the dynamic method reveals increased market power of banks compared to its static 
counterpart. Also, Shaffer (2004b) suggests that the potential existence of monopsony power 
could be mitigated if lagged input prices are fitted in the revenue equation. This argument is 
based on the recognition that an upward-sloping supply curve for banks will have the effect of 
driving up input prices as a function of contemporaneous quantities of bank outputs, whereas the 
revenue levels predicted by PR may respond to input prices only with a lag (particularly in the 
case of long-run competition). To this end, an autoregressive-distributed lag model is specified, 
as follows:15
' ' ' ' ' ' '
0 0 , 1 1 1, 1 1, 1 2 2, 2 2, 1
' ' ' ' '
3 3, 3 3, 1 4 4 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
it l i t it l it it l it
it l it it l it i it
TR TR w w w w
w w EA EA u
β β β β β β
β β β β η
− −
− −
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
−
'
3
  (2) 
where t-1 is the one-period time lag, η are the individual effects, u is the idiosyncratic 
disturbance and, as in the static case, the H-statistic is obtained by ' ' '1 2H β β β= + + . Eq (2) is 
                                                 
15 This model has been proposed by Delis et al. (2008). Note that the model assumes ( | , ) 0it it iE u x η = , where x is 
the set of explanatory variables. This assumption implies that for all t and s 
, where s is the number of instrumented lags. Essentially, this rules 
out the possibility of feedback from lagged revenue to current x
' '
0[ ( ln ln )] 0is it l it itE x TR TR xβΔ − Δ − Δ =β
s (see Arellano, 2003). 
 15
estimated using the dynamic panel data estimation method proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998).16  
  The results (see column H4 of Table 6) indicate that for some countries – especially 
those ones still in the transition phase – the dynamic model produces somewhat lower H-
statistics (see e.g. the values for Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Ukraine). In contrast, countries 
with relatively stable economies and higher ebrd values do not seem to be significantly affected 
by the dynamics in the data. Nonetheless, this may be a rather interesting issue for future 
research.     
 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper has described the competitive conditions in the CEE banking sectors over the 
period 1999-2006, using an empirical framework that is based on the seminal work of Panzar and 
Rosse (1987). The empirical findings suggest a wide variation of the competitive conditions 
between the banking systems examined, with some being characterized by significant market 
power, while others are closer to monopolistically competitive practices. In addition, the 
structural and macroeconomic environment is highly important in shaping bank revenues, which 
is a critical feature in the identification of market power under the PR approach. The extent that 
factors like increased foreign ownership, financial reform, deregulation and institutional 
characteristics are in a constant state of flux in the CEE countries, may have important 
implications for the conditions prevailing in the banking sector and the associated policies of the 
monetary and fiscal authorities. 
                                                 
−
−
16 The instruments used are  
and . For more details on this method, see Delis et al., 2008). 
, 2 , 3 ,1 , 2 , 3 ,1 , 2ln , ln ,..., ln ; ln , ln ,..., ln ; ln ,i t i t i i t i t i ji tTR TR TR EA EA EA w− − − −
, 3 ,1ln ,..., ln  ji t jiw w− , 2 , 2ln , lni t i tTR EA−Δ Δ
 16
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Table 1a 
Evolution of banking-system and macroeconomic characteristics in CEE countries over the 
period 1999-2006 
Year ebrd conc3 state foreign gdpcap inf gdpgr 
1 2.706 64.894 30.691 32.948 2868.2 21.456 2.895 
2 2.767 65.114 22.678 46.729 2964.0 18.825 5.315 
3 2.848 66.687 18.796 49.962 3049.4 10.254 6.058 
4 2.983 62.600 17.484 51.228 3195.2 5.793 5.676 
5 3.004 59.992 15.538 55.073 3379.0 5.105 7.013 
6 3.118 59.930 12.136 52.298 3605.5 6.391 7.942 
7 3.250 58.949 12.399 55.502 3857.5 6.066 7.416 
8 3.288 61.148 11.934 59.970 4182.5 5.429 9.119 
Average 2.996 62.664 17.703 50.469 3387.8 9.912 6.430 
 
Table 1b 
Banking-system and macroeconomic characteristics of CEE countries (country averages) 
Country ebrd conc3 state foreign gdpcap inf gdpgr 
Albania 2.413 76.806 40.688 58.000 1391.8 2.375 6.175 
Armenia 2.400 62.257 0.913 50.575 895.4 2.400 10.500 
Azerbaijan 2.225 83.392 60.238 5.150 1007.1 3.325 13.513 
Belarus 1.438 77.362 66.713 11.763 1928.7 78.713 7.063 
Bosnia 2.450 54.331 21.363 64.113 1510.6 2.550 5.525 
Bulgaria 3.300 53.882 14.075 73.113 1879.5 5.863 4.825 
Croatia 3.625 57.384 8.575 82.925 5336.9 3.188 3.750 
Czech Republic 3.675 64.813 11.000 77.375 6598.8 2.463 3.663 
Estonia 3.813 98.140 0.988 97.038 5739.5 3.675 7.988 
FYROM 2.700 78.018 1.725 44.850 1925.5 2.263 20.950 
Georgia 2.450 67.293 0.000 39.463 678.9 7.675 6.338 
Hungary 4.000 62.102 7.963 74.103 5706.1 6.636 4.363 
Kazakhstan 2.750 66.396 5.550 20.975 1928.0 8.150 9.375 
Latvia 3.475 54.593 3.688 59.850 4303.7 4.000 8.000 
Lithuania 3.250 82.227 11.625 79.500 4032.4 1.238 6.100 
Moldova 2.450 69.848 13.625 32.138 336.8 16.825 4.763 
Poland 3.400 55.214 23.738 69.525 4750.3 4.050 3.700 
Romania 2.813 67.253 31.225 56.875 2112.3 23.913 4.638 
Serbia 1.913 54.602 47.475 32.738 2286.6 37.425 2.200 
Slovakia 3.338 77.480 13.950 77.063 4104.2 7.063 4.013 
Slovenia 3.300 64.288 24.613 17.925 10474.2 5.638 4.000 
Ukraine 2.325 49.770 10.538 15.813 912.0 12.563 6.450 
Average 2.996 63.664 17.703 50.469 3387.8 9.912 6.430 
Note  
The variables displayed on the table are as follows. ebrd: the EBRD index of banking sector reform; conc3: the 3-
bank concentration ratio obtained from the World Bank; state: share of majority state-owned banks’ assets in total 
banking sector assets (obtained from EBRD); foreign: share of total banking sector assets in banks with foreign 
ownership exceeding 50 per cent (obtained from EBRD); gdpcap: GDP per capita in US dollars (obtained from  
EBRD); inf: the inflation rate (obtained from EBRD); gdpgr: annual GDP growth (obtained from EBRD).  
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 Table 2a 
Evolution of bank-level variables over the period 1999-2006 
Year rtr roa w1 w2 w3 ea la 
1 47027.6 0.015 0.084 1.475 0.025 0.187 0.429 
2 45790.2 0.015 0.079 2.306 0.024 0.186 0.436 
3 41493.8 0.011 0.074 2.336 0.022 0.183 0.442 
4 41270.9 0.010 0.053 2.064 0.022 0.192 0.483 
5 43909.5 0.013 0.048 1.864 0.021 0.181 0.513 
6 52569.4 0.015 0.054 1.843 0.022 0.172 0.515 
7 55941.1 0.017 0.053 1.866 0.020 0.155 0.543 
8 67968.6 0.018 0.052 1.872 0.018 0.141 0.558 
Average 49504.9 0.014 0.123 2.183 0.021 0.167 0.491 
 
Table 2b  
Number of banks, observations and averages of the bank-level variables by country 
Country No of banks 
No of 
observations rtr roa w1 w2 w3 ea 
Albania 11 57 12642.4 0.016 0.030 1.048 0.011 0.126 
Armenia 15 71 3260.6 0.018 0.050 1.304 0.032 0.217 
Azerbaijan 21 102 4795.6 0.022 0.081 1.098 0.025 0.270 
Belarus 17 92 1195.8 0.024 0.120 1.224 0.040 0.222 
Bosnia 28 138 13165.3 0.005 0.025 1.216 0.024 0.208 
Bulgaria 26 181 824.8 0.013 0.044 1.605 0.016 0.172 
Croatia 38 235 45577.8 0.013 0.043 1.007 0.018 0.158 
Czech Republic 24 169 167943.5 0.008 0.109 2.896 0.010 0.103 
Estonia 10 55 72537.3 0.011 0.029 4.150 0.018 0.173 
FYROM 15 84 12838.8 0.011 0.036 0.964 0.022 0.303 
Georgia 11 66 5431.5 0.036 0.060 0.795 0.031 0.256 
Hungary 30 180 102191.4 0.015 0.070 4.101 0.018 0.123 
Kazakhstan 24 140 24168.7 0.026 0.190 1.437 0.022 0.205 
Latvia 24 168 20547.0 0.012 0.023 1.441 0.017 0.123 
Lithuania 9 68 35020.6 0.005 0.028 0.756 0.021 0.128 
Moldova 16 92 2516.3 0.039 0.059 0.764 0.032 0.260 
Poland 53 289 134323.2 0.012 0.067 4.419 0.019 0.145 
Romania 27 180 7609.9 0.006 0.090 1.328 0.033 0.180 
Serbia 36 181 17357.3 0.003 0.029 2.111 0.034 0.267 
Slovakia 16 112 82663.3 0.007 0.046 9.302 0.011 0.096 
Slovenia 21 129 87437.3 0.012 1.218 0.871 0.014 0.108 
Ukraine 57 298 10899.8 0.018 0.078 1.157 0.024 0.166 
Average 529 3087 49504.9 0.014 0.123 2.183 0.021 0.167 
Note 
The variables displayed on the table are as follows. rtr: total revenue of banks in real terms; roa: return on assets 
(total profits before tax/total assets); w1: price of funds (interest expenses/total deposits); w2: price of physical 
capital [(overheads-personnel expenses)/fixed assets]; w3: price of labor (personnel expenses/total assets); ea: 
capital ratio (equity/total assets). All bank-level variables are obtained from BankScope. 
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Table 3 
Input price coefficients and H-statistics for CEE banking systems  
Country lnw1 lnw2 lnw3 lnea H 
Albania 0.640 a 0.027 -0.336b -1.649 a 0.331 
Armenia -0.174 b 0.309 b 0.245 b -0.316 b 0.379 
Azerbaijan 0.126 0.293 b 0.171 b -0.903 a 0.591 
Belarus 0.356 b 0.263 b -0.176 b -0.571 a 0.443 
Bosnia 0.789 a -0.099 -0.802 a -0.785 a -0.112* 
Bulgaria 0.314 b 0.114 -0.364 b -0.298 b 0.064** 
Croatia 0.246 b 0.096 -0.409 a -0.137 b -0.067** 
Czech Republic 0.401 b 0.085 -0.128 -0.166 b 0.357 
Estonia 0.109 -0.279 b -0.372 b -0.070 -0.542* 
FYROM -0.465 b 0.238 b 0.060 -0.881 a -0.166* 
Georgia 0.438 b 0.030 -0.059 -0.340 b 0.410 
Hungary 0.321 b 0.056 -0.432 b -0.186 b -0.055** 
Kazakhstan 0.198 b -0.028 -0.775 a -0.083 -0.604* 
Latvia 0.407 b 0.198 b 0.043 0.317 b 0.647 
Lithuania 0.283 b 0.172 b -0.524 a -0.218 -0.069** 
Moldova 0.269 b 0.052 0.185 b -0.451 a 0.505 
Poland 0.406 b 0.190 b 0.255 b -0.373 b 0.851 
Romania 0.664 a 0.073 -0.491 a -0.538 a 0.246 
Serbia 0.738 a 0.241 b -0.317 b -0.236 b 0.743 
Slovakia 0.210 b 0.363 b -0.158 1.537 a 0.415 
Slovenia 0.014 0.199 b -0.205 b -0.502 a 0.008** 
Ukraine 0.397 b -0.068 -0.263 b -0.382 b 0.066** 
Note  
The table displays the estimated coefficients of the input prices (lnw1, lnw2, lnw3) and the H-statistic (H) for each 
country in the sample using the Panzar and Rosse (1987) method. * denotes that H is statistically less than zero (at 
the 5 per cent level); ** denote that the H=0 hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 per cent level. Also, a and b denote 
that the input prices are statistically significant at the 1 per cent and at the 5 per cent level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Correlations between structural and macroeconomic variables 
 ebrd conc3 state foreign gdpcap inf 
ebrd 1.000      
conc3 -0.075 1.000     
state -0.567 0.198 1.000    
foreign 0.717 -0.015 -0.530 1.000   
gdpcap 0.699 0.024 -0.167 0.387 1.000  
inf -0.491 0.080 0.421 -0.319 -0.192 1.000 
Note 
The variables displayed on the table are as follows. ebrd: the EBRD index of banking sector reform; conc3: the 3-
bank concentration ratio obtained from the World Bank; state: share of majority state-owned banks’ assets in total 
banking sector assets (obtained from EBRD); foreign: share of total banking sector assets in banks with foreign 
ownership exceeding 50 per cent (obtained from EBRD); gdpcap: GDP per capita in US dollars (obtained from the 
EBRD); inf: the inflation rate (obtained from the EBRD). 
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Table 5 
Estimation results from the full sample (dependent variable: lnrtr) 
 I II III IV V 
lnrtr coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. 
lnw1 0.304 15.44 0.282 14.04 0.282 13.98 0.278 15.17 0.276 15.04 
lnw2 0.085 4.64 0.085 4.58 0.090 4.83 0.056 3.31 0.060 3.52 
lnw3 -0.205 -5.78 -0.251 -6.94 -0.262 -7.23 -0.129 -3.90 -0.138 -4.14 
lnea -0.367 -12.45 -0.376 -12.48 -0.376 -12.43 -0.361 -13.20 -0.361 -13.15 
ebrd 0.752 16.68         
conc3   0.004 3.42 0.003 2.88 0.000 0.26 0.000 -0.08 
state   -0.007 -7.40   -0.005 -5.36   
foreign     0.005 6.44   0.002 3.54 
gdpcap       0.000 23.07 0.000 22.99 
inf       0.009 12.01 0.009 11.90 
constant 6.010 33.17 7.900 46.28 7.534 44.50 7.058 44.98 6.831 44.23 
H 0.183  0.116  0.110  0.205  0.199  
H=0 18.710 0.000 7.360 0.007 6.590 0.100 27.160 0.000 25.470 0.000 
H=1 370.930 0.000 424.960 0.000 427.050 0.000 408.760 0.000 413.380 0.000 
Note 
The table presents coefficients and t-statistics of regressions on the whole sample (3087 observations). The variables 
displayed on the table are as follows. rtr: total revenue of banks in real terms; w1: price of funds (interest 
expenses/total deposits); w2: price of physical capital [(overheads-personnel expenses)/fixed assets]; w3: price of 
labor (personnel expenses/total assets); ea: capital ratio (equity/total assets). ebrd: the EBRD index of banking sector 
reform; conc3: the 3-bank concentration ratio obtained from the World Bank; state: share of majority state-owned 
banks’ assets in total banking sector assets (obtained from EBRD); foreign: share of total banking sector assets in 
banks with foreign ownership exceeding 50 per cent (obtained from EBRD); gdpcap: GDP per capita in US dollars 
(obtained from the EBRD); inf: the inflation rate (obtained from the EBRD). All bank-level variables are in 
logarithms and are obtained from BankScope. H represents the H-statistic of the equation (i.e. lnw1+lnw2+lnw3), 
H=0 and H=1 represent the x-squared values of the respective null hypotheses (along with their p-values).  
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Table 6 
Sensitivity analysis 
Country H1 H2 H3 H4 
Albania 0.305 0.311 0.240 0.197 
Armenia 0.366 0.358 0.370 0.302 
Azerbaijan 0.515 0.523 0.508 0.405 
Belarus 0.467 0.408 0.414 0.278 
Bosnia -0.110* -0.089* -0.091* -0.107* 
Bulgaria 0.114 0.123 0.070** -0.296* 
Croatia -0.009** -0.108* -0.111* -0.288* 
Czech Republic 0.323 0.348 0.360 0.301 
Estonia -0.587* -0.508* -0.515* -0.509* 
FYROM -0.168* -0.089* -0.104* -0.113* 
Georgia 0.479 0.471 0.448 0.459 
Hungary -0.007** 0.010** 0.013** -0.006** 
Kazakhstan -0.588* -0.507* -0.540* -0.780* 
Latvia 0.629 0.653 0.622 0.601 
Lithuania 0.043** 0.057** 0.002** -0.106* 
Moldova 0.554 0.508 0.516 0.563 
Poland 0.808 0.789 0.705 0.780 
Romania 0.304 0.209 0.286 0.305 
Slovakia 0.453 0.417 0.422 0.421 
Slovenia 0.003** -0.010** -0.031** 0.017** 
Ukraine 0.006** -0.104* -0.071** -0.129* 
Note 
The table presents H-statistics derived from alternative specifications. H1 is obtained from the estimation of Eq. (1) 
using real interest revenue as the dependent variable. H2 is obtained from the same equation with total revenue over 
assets as the dependent variable. H3 corresponds to the estimation of Eq. (1) when including the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to loans and the ratio of loans to assets as additional bank-specific control variables. H4 is obtained from 
the estimation of Eq. (1) using the dynamic panel data method. * denotes that the H-statistic is statistically less than 
zero (at the 5 per cent level of significance); ** denote that the H=0 hypothesis is not rejected at the 5 per cent level. 
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